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Abstract: Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that
apply generally. The U.S. for example has tended to rely heavily on general
doctrines. One such doctrine which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter is the
“economic substance” doctrine. Yet as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out
“although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of
complicated tax abuse judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to
enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation leading to substantial uncertainty and risk.” One way to limit the discretionary power of judges and
overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is by formalizing the
doctrines as the US has done by codifying the “economic substance” doctrine
in 2010. As explained in part 2 of this chapter a limitation of the “economic
substance” doctrine whether it is established judicially or codified by statute
may be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax
avoidance. Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this limitation by adopting a statutory General Anti-Abuse Rule
(“GAAR”). GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes
acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But they do so based on whether
the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions as they were
conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer is relying on for achieving
the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal (“FCA”)
explained “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to schemes that are not
inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory provision invoked by
the taxpayer GAAR effectively limits the scope of the principle in
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]very man
is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under the
appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.” Based on Canada’s
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experience with the GAAR parts 4 and 5 identify and explain the nexus
between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting and the implications
of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S. should Congress choose
to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the Supreme Court of Canada
(“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of
Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant
tax provision the court has also held that it will only give effect to those
intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision and will
not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to convey. Part
5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S. Supreme
Court and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S. courts
should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore it would be up to Congress as it is
similarly up to Canada’s Parliament to carefully and clearly draft its legislative
intentions otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be undermined.
Keywords: tax avoidance, GAAR, US, Canada
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1 Introduction
It is a well-established view that taxpayers ought to be “free to use their
ingenuity to reduce their tax bills by any lawful means, however contrived
those means might be and however far the tax consequences might diverge
from the real economic position.” (HMRC 2015, p.4). Well-known expressions of
this view can be found in the U.K. House of Lords’ decision in Duke of
Westminster v CIR as well as in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gregory v
Helvering.
In its consideration of the problem of tax avoidance, Graham Aaronson’s
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”) Study Group explained that “to those
who hold this view the appropriate response is for Parliament to introduce
specific rules to block such attempts.”(Aaronson 2011, para 3.1). Such rules are
commonly referred to as Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules (“SAARs”). While SAARs
are commonly used around the world, they are problematic because they tend to
produce overly complicated and technical tax rules, which can become burdensome on taxpayers. (Institute for Fiscal Studies 2009, para 2.9). They may also be
counterproductive because “the more detailed the rules, the more opportunity
there may be for those wishing to do so to find and exploit loopholes.” (Institute
2009, para 2.1). Moreover, they merely provide a reactive response to known
schemes, leaving tax authorities to play a “never-ending cat and mouse game”
that involves “drafting a specific rule anytime a new avoidance arrangement is
uncovered.” (Silvani 2013, p. 5).
Rules targeting specific known schemes are not the only tools available in
the battle against tax avoidance. Legal systems also use measures that apply
generally. Such measures may be developed by the courts in the form of
judicial doctrines.1 The U.S., for example, has tended to rely heavily on such

1 Weeghel identifies some of the typical doctrines as follows: “sham, legally ineffective transactions, substance over form, abuse of law, fraus legis, or simply as the general anti-avoidance
rule” (Weeghel, 2010, Vol. 95a at 22).
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doctrines. One such doctrine, which is discussed in part 2 of this chapter, is the
“economic substance” doctrine. Yet, as Xiong and Evans recently pointed out,
“although such judicial doctrines can be used to deal with various aspects of
complicated tax abuse, judges tended sometimes to limit and sometimes to
enlarge the scope of jurisprudential interpretation, leading to substantial
uncertainty and risk.” (2014, p. 688). One way to limit the discretionary
power of judges and overcome the uncertainty apparent in their judgments is
by formalizing the doctrines, as the US has done by codifying the “economic
substance” doctrine in 2010.
As explained in part 2 of this chapter, a limitation of the “economic substance” doctrine, whether it is established judicially or codified by statute, may
be its focus on the taxpayer’s intentions as the basis for attacking tax avoidance.
Part 3 of this chapter goes on to explain that the U.S. could overcome this
limitation by adopting a statutory GAAR. GAARs also impose generally applicable limits on what constitutes acceptable (reasonable) tax arrangements. But
they do so based on whether the arrangements are consistent with the legislature’s intentions, as they were conveyed in the tax provision which the taxpayer
is relying on for achieving the tax advantage in question. As Canada’s Federal
Court of Appeal (“FCA”) explained, “by confining legitimate tax avoidance to
schemes that are not inconsistent with the policy underlying the statutory
provision invoked by the taxpayer, GAAR effectively limits the scope of the
principle in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Duke of Westminster… that ‘[e]
very man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under
the appropriate Acts is less than it would otherwise be’.”(Canada v. Imperial Oil
Ltd. 2004, para. 32).
Based on Canada’s experience with the GAAR, parts 4 and 5 identify and
explain the nexus between statutory interpretation and legislative drafting,
and the implications of this nexus on the application of a GAAR in the U.S.,
should Congress choose to take this route. Part 4 identifies that while the
Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) has recognized the need to apply a purposive interpretation of Canada’s GAAR in order to ascertain parliament’s intentions in the relevant tax provision, the court has also held that it will only give
effect to those intentions which were clearly conveyed by the relevant provision, and will not invent a legislative intention which parliament has failed to
convey. Part 5 notes that such judicial restraint has also been taken by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and therefore a similar approach could be expected by the U.S.
courts should Congress adopt a GAAR. Therefore, it would be up to Congress,
as it is similarly up to Canada’s Parliament, to carefully and clearly draft its
legislative intentions, otherwise the effectiveness of a GAAR would be
undermined.
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2 Combating tax avoidance: the US experience
with the economic substance doctrine
2.1 The Origins of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrine:
Gregory v. Helvering (1935)
The evolution of anti-tax avoidance doctrine in the US begins with the seminal
case of Gregory v. Helvering, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1935. Evelyn
Gregory was the owner of all the shares of a company called United Mortgage
Company (“United”). United Mortgage in turn owned 1,000 shares of stock of a
company called Monitor Securities Corporation (“Monitor”). Mrs. Gregory
wanted to sell the Monitor shares and to obtain the cash in her own hands,
but having United sell the shares and distribute the cash or having United
distribute the shares for her to sell would both have resulted in a dividend
taxed at high rates with no offset for her basis. Instead, on 18 September 1928
Mrs. Gregory created Averill Corp and three days later United transferred the
1000 shares in Monitor to Averill. On 24 September Mrs. Gregory dissolved
Averill and distributed the 1000 shares in Monitor to herself (a taxable liquidation resulting in a capital gain), and on the same day sold the shares for
$133,333.33. She claimed there was a cost basis of $57,325.45, and she should
be taxed on a net capital gain on $76,007.88.
On her 1928 federal income tax return, Gregory treated the transfer of
Monitor shares to Averill as a tax-free corporate reorganization, under Revenue
Act of 1928 section 112. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that in
economic substance there was no business reorganization, and that the sole
purpose of the transaction was to enable Mrs. Gregory to pay tax on the value of
the Monitor shares at the favorable capital gains rate with an offset for her basis,
rather than at the higher rate that would have applied to the entire amount had
United distributed Monitor shares worth $133,333.33 to her as a dividend.
In the ensuing litigation, the Board of Tax Appeals (a predecessor to today’s
United States Tax Court) ruled in favor of the taxpayer. See Gregory v.
Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 223 (1932). On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. In his opinion, Learned Hand J used
the following frequently quoted words:
“[A] transaction … does not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid,
or, if one choose, to evade, taxation. Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.
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[…]
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such a transaction, not even
though the facts answer the dictionary definitions of each term used in the statutory
definition….[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words, …
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the setting in which all appear,
and which all collectively create.
[…]
The purpose of the section is plain enough: men engaged in enterprises … might wish to
consolidate… their holdings. … But the underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand….
To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not one of the transactions contemplated as corporate
“reorganizations.”

The Supreme Court affirmed. It held that although the letter of the law might
arguably have been complied with, the intention of the Act was not to allow
reorganizations merely for the purpose of tax avoidance. In the course of its
judgment, the Court said the following:
“It is earnestly contended on behalf of the taxpayer that since every element required by
[the statute] is to be found in what was done, a statutory reorganization was effected; and
that the motive of the taxpayer thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result
or make unlawful what the statute allows. It is quite true that if a reorganization in reality
was effected within the meaning of [the statute], the ulterior purpose mentioned will be
disregarded. The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would
be his [or her] taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be
doubted. [...] But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the
tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended. The reasoning of the court below
[i. e., the reasoning of the Court of Appeals] in justification of a negative answer leaves
little to be said.
When [the statute] speaks of a transfer of assets by one corporation to another, it means a
transfer made “in pursuance of a plan of reorganization” [...] of corporate business; and
not a transfer of assets by one corporation to another in pursuance of a plan having no
relation to the business of either, as plainly is the case here. Putting aside, then, the
question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and fixing the character of the
proceeding by what actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no
business or corporate purpose-a mere device which put on the form of a corporate
reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object and
accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize
a business or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares to the
petitioner. No doubt, a new and valid corporation was created. But that corporation was
nothing more than a contrivance to the end last described. It was brought into existence for
no other purpose; it performed, as it was intended from the beginning it should perform,
no other function. When that limited function had been exercised, it immediately was put
to death.
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In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are susceptible of but one
interpretation. The whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms of [the
statute], was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization, and nothing else. [... T]he transaction upon its face lies outside
the plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality
and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.

As Assaf Likhovski has shown, Gregory needs to be understood against its
historical background (Likhovski 2004). The election of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt in 1932 was followed by sharp increases in the tax rates on the rich,
especially in 1935–36, and by hearings that exposed massive tax avoidance by
rich individuals like former Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon. Thus, it is
not surprising that Judge Hand ruled in favor of the government or that the
Supreme Court affirmed.
The Gregory decision set the background for all that followed. It should be
noted, however, that there was a subtle shift in emphasis between Judge
Hand’s opinion and the Supreme Court one. While Hand emphasized that
what Mrs. Gregory had done was not what Congress intended, The Supreme
Court, while repeating Hand’s formulation, also emphasized the taxpayer’s
lack of business purpose, and it was the latter formulation that eventually
led to the development and ultimate codification of the “economic substance”
doctrine in 2010.

2.2 The Development of the Judicial Economic Substance
Doctrine, 1935–1978
In the years following Gregory, the Supreme Court decided a series of economic
substance cases. In most of them, it followed Gregory in ruling that a transaction
lacked economic substance if the taxpayer could not establish a non-tax business purpose [cites]. A good example is Knetsch (1960), in which the taxpayer
borrowed at 3.5 % to invest in an annuity paying 2.5 %, because he could deduct
the interest on the loan at a tax rate of over 90 %, converting a before tax loss to
an after-tax profit.
The “modern” economic substance doctrine is based on the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Frank Lyon (1978), in which the Court stated that:
[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic substance
which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with
tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that
have meaningless labels attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights
and duties effectuated by the parties. (Frank Lyon 1978, pp. 581–4)
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As many critics have pointed out, the Court got its economics wrong (Wolfman
1981). But more importantly, there is no reference at all to Congressional intent,
which was the basis of the decision in Gregory. The entire emphasis shifts to the
taxpayer’s purpose.
This led to the development of the economic substance doctrine in the
Courts of Appeal, which defined it as having two prongs: Whether the taxpayer
intended the transaction to be profitable before tax (the subjective prong), and
whether there was in fact a reasonable chance of making a profit (the objective
prong). In some Circuits, the doctrine was applied in the conjunctive form (the
taxpayer had to satisfy both prongs), while in others it was applied in disjunctive form (satisfying either prong was sufficient) (Keinan 2006). Notably, neither
prong depended on Congressional purpose.

2.3 The First Tax Shelter Wave, 1970–1986
Between 1970 and 1986, a series of “tax shelters” were developed by promoters
and marketed to tens of thousands of taxpayers that had income that was not
subject to withholding tax, such as physicians, dentists and lawyers. The typical
“first wave” shelter involved a leveraged investment in property such as real
estate, livestock, or films that was subject to favorable depreciation rules. Under
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crane (1952) and Tufts (1983), the taxpayer
could include borrowed amounts in its basis even if the loan was non-recourse,
and even if the amount borrowed ultimately exceeded the value of the property.
Taxpayers received both interest and depreciation deductions in the early years
of the investment, which they could use to shelter their other income, while any
gain came much later in the form of lower taxed capital gains.
The IRS tried to combat the shelters using economic substance, but with a
few exceptions (e. g., Estate of Franklin) it was not very successful. In addition,
there were too many shelter cases, which overwhelmed the Tax Court.
Eventually, Congress took a successive series of steps that gradually eliminated
the benefits of this type of shelter: the recapture provisions (IRC 1245), the at-risk
rule (IRC 465), and especially the passive activities loss rule (IRC 469) of 1986,
which led to massive contraction of the tax shelter industry.2 In addition, the

2 The shelters were built on the ability to borrow, acquire property with the borrowed funds,
obtain interest and depreciation deductions, and later sell the property with a lower capital
gains rate. The provisions mentioned eliminated the capital gains treatment, excluded losses
due to borrowing when the taxpayer was not at risk, and segregated passive losses from active
income.
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rate reduction from 50 % to 28 % and the elimination of the ordinary income/
capital gains differential in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 helped reduce the
motivation for tax avoidance.

2.4 The Second Tax Shelter Wave, 1993–2006
By 1991, however, the ordinary income and capital gains rate began to diverge,
and the Clinton tax hike (1993) and Congress cutting the capital gains rate (1997)
created the background for the second tax shelter wave.
Unlike the first wave, which was mass marketed to individual taxpayers, the
second tax shelter wave was aimed at corporate and a few high net worth
individual taxpayers. Moreover, while the tax shelters in the 1970s and 1980s
were devised by small promoters, most of the tax shelters of the 1990s cycle
were devised or at least promoted by the major accounting firms, all of which
participated in helping their clients to engage in tax shelters.
The IRS initially responded to this tax shelter activity by requiring registration of the tax shelters under IRC 6111, listing some tax shelters under IRC 6112,
and requiring disclosure of certain transactions under IRC 6011. Each of these
provisions sought to increase transparency as to the identification of transactions that the IRS might seek to challenge. For example, under IRC 6111, some
transactions that met certain tax-advantaged criteria had to be “registered”
through the use of disclosure forms filed with the IRS. IRC 6112, the “list
maintenance” provision, required advisors on specified types of transactions to
maintain lists of the transactions and those who engaged in them, available for
possible inspection by the IRS.
At the same time, the IRS began to litigate against specific tax shelters in
the courts, using the economic substance doctrine. However, before 2003 the
IRS’s litigation record was mixed: It won the ACM, Winn-Dixie, ASA and Saba
cases but lost Northern Indiana Public Service Co., Boca, Compaq, IES and UPS.3
As a result, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation in its February 2003
3 Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1997); ACM
Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3rd Cir. 1998); ASA Investerings Partnership v.
Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 1135
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Boca Investerings v. Commissioner, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2001); WinnDixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); IES Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001); Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778
(5th Cir. 2001); United Parcel Service v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001). See also
Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), in which the Supreme Court endorsed a literal approach
to the Code similar to the technical arguments underlying tax shelters.

10

R. S. Avi-Yonah and A. Pichhadze

report on tax shelters engaged in by Enron Corporation before its bankruptcy
was of the opinion that many of the Enron tax shelters would have been
upheld by a court if the issue was litigated. (Joint Committee on Taxation
2003).
In November 2003, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
U.S. Senate held widely publicized hearings on individual tax shelters. All of the
Big Four announced that they were discontinuing their tax shelter activities.
Some individuals associated with the tax shelter activities of the late 1990s faced
criminal charges related to a variety of tax shelter activities. The IRS also
promulgated new ethics rules that prevented law firms from giving opinions
on tax shelters unless they independently verified the business purpose of each
transaction, thereby making the lawyers into an independent supervisor of the
shelters.4
From 2003 onward, the IRS began winning a series of tax shelter cases with
increasing momentum, using economic substance.5 This eventually led former
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy Pamela Olson to declare in
2006 that “the tax shelter war is over and the IRS has won.” One should note, in
fact, that most tax shelters were settled under a series of IRS initiatives without
penalties, so that the taxpayers did not lose (they just paid the tax they would
have paid absent the shelter, plus interest at a lower rate than what they could
earn in the interim). And in the case of some shelters, the taxpayers also got to
keep some of the tax benefits.

4 The IRS first changed the regulations to limit the defenses available to taxpayers facing the
accuracy-related penalty for certain returns filed after December 31, 2002. Treas. Reg. 1.6664-4
(d) (2002). Second, the IRS changed the standards governing written opinions under Circular
230, the ethical standards governing practice before the IRS, effective December 20, 2004.
Circular 230, 31 CFR 10.35(e)(2) (2004). In 2007, the IRS finalized regulations relating to the
disclosure and registration of “reportable transactions” (which include listed transactions like
COBRA, transactions entered into under conditions of confidentiality, transactions involving
refundable or contingent fees, certain transactions involving significant losses, and other
transactions of interest). 72 Fed. Reg. 43,157 (Aug. 3, 2007). In addition, Congress amended
the tax return preparer penalty rules under IRC 6694 to raise the standard all return preparers
must meet to “more likely than not,” and a similar standard has been adopted under Circular
230. IRC 6694 (2007); Circ. 230, sec. 10.34 (2007).
5 Boca Investerings v. Commissioner, 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Long Term Capital Holdings
v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 150 Fed. App. 40 (2d Cir. 2005); Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2006) (reversing district court judgment);
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006); Coltec Industries, Inc. v.
United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (reversing district court finding); TIFD III-E Inc.
(Castle Harbor) v. United States, 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006); cf. also Times Mirror v. Comm’r, 125
T.C. 110 (2005); Merrill Lynch & Co. v. Comm’r, 386 F.3d 464 (2d Cir. 2004).

GAARs and Legislative Drafting

11

2.5 Codification and its Critics, 2006–2010
In 2010, Congress codified the economic substance doctrine as Internal Revenue
Code section 7701(o). The main change in the codified version was that it
mandated following the conjunctive version of the doctrine in all the Circuits,
and imposed stiff penalties for transactions lacking economic substance.
However, many critics remain skeptical of codification, which has not yet
been tested in the courts (Wolfman 2004). The main concern is that the codified
version, even more than the judicial version, provides a road map to successful
avoidance. What is needed is (a) a credible taxpayer bolstered by contemporaneous documentation to satisfy the subjective prong, and (b) a reasonable
chance of making a profit built into the transaction. A good example of a
transaction that managed to pass muster under this test is the Caterpillar
restructuring, which was never challenged by the IRS although it was clearly
tax motivated [cite PSI report].
As many critics (e. g., Leandra Lederman) have pointed out, the basic
problem with economic substance is the focus on the taxpayer’s motivation,
which goes all the way back to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gregory
(Lederman 2010, p. 389). If the focus were instead on Congressional motivation,
it is hard to see how transactions like the tax shelter upheld by the Courts of
Appeal in Compaq and IES could survive an IRS challenge.

2.6 A Third Tax Shelter Wave, 2010-?
While it is too early to say with confidence, there may be a third tax shelter wave
going on at present. A good indicator is the rise of so-called inversion transactions that exploit loopholes in IRC section 7874 to enable US corporations to
become subsidiaries of foreign corporations and thereafter distribute their earnings out of the US as deductible interest or royalties. These transactions are
clearly tax motivated but dressed up to appear as if they had a business
purpose, thereby satisfying economic substance. We expect Congress will have
to act again soon if the corporate tax base is to be preserved.6
6 While it is true that U.S. tax law has recently been tilted toward defending the competitiveness of US based MNEs, including provisions like check the box and the CFC to CFC payment
rule that openly try to help multinationals shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions
abroad, this attitude should not preclude the U.S. From adopting a GAAR. The provisions relied
upon by most U.S. Multinationals are part of the tax law and represent the intent of Congress,
and therefore relying on them is appropriate and would not be affected by the GAAR. What
Caterpillar did was however abusive and not in accordance with Congressional intent, which is
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3 GAARs: an analysis based on the legislature’s
intentions
By now, numerous countries have already adopted statutory GAARs (Ernst and
Young 2013, p. 3). As suggested by Aaronson’s GAAR Study Group, a GAAR can
be justified on the basis that “levying of tax is the principal means by which the
state pays for the services and facilities which it provides for its citizens,”
(Aaronson 2011, para. 3.3) and thus it is “reasonable to impose some limit on
the ability of taxpayers to escape their share of the tax burden by looking for
loopholes or weaknesses in the tax rules, and then constructing elaborate
schemes designed to exploit them. To be consistent with the rule of law this
limit should be imposed by legislation.”(Aaronson 2011, para. 3.4).
As Weeghel explained, “[a]lthough the precise features of GAARs differ,
the common elements required for their application seem to be (a) a transaction or set of transactions that is solely or predominantly aimed at tax avoidance, and (b) if given effect the object and purpose of the applicable tax law
would be violated.”(Weeghel 2010, n. 12 at p. 22). Focusing on the second
element, note that for a tax arrangement to be acceptable (reasonable) it
must be consistent with the legislative intent which underlies the tax provision
being relied on for the tax advantage in question. An “abuse”7 of that legislative intent would constitute tax avoidance, notwithstanding that the arrangement is otherwise in compliance with a literal interpretation of the tax
provision. (Canada Trustco, n. 31, paras. 13, 16, 49).

why it is currently under criminal investigation for tax fraud. The codification of the economic
substance doctrine was adopted on a bipartisan basis and there is no reason why a GAAR that is
narrowly drafted to apply only to transactions that are truly abusive and inconsistent with
Congressional intent cannot receive similar bipartisan support.
7 In Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada 2005, para. 45, the SCC elaborated as follows on
the type of circumstances in which an arrangement could amount to an ‘abuse’:
This analysis will lead to a finding of abusive tax avoidance when a taxpayer relies on
specific provisions of the Income Tax Act in order to achieve an outcome that those
provisions seek to prevent. As well, abusive tax avoidance will occur when a transaction
defeats the underlying rationale of the provisions that are relied upon. An abuse may also
result from an arrangement that circumvents the application of certain provisions, such as
specific anti-avoidance rules, in a manner that frustrates or defeats the object, spirit or
purpose of those provisions. By contrast, abuse is not established where it is reasonable to
conclude that an avoidance transaction under s. 245(3) was within the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions that confer the tax benefit.

GAARs and Legislative Drafting

13

The UK’s GAAR, for example, states that a “tax arrangement”8 must not be
“abusive”. Tax arrangements are “abusive” if:
they are arrangements the entering into or carrying out of which cannot reasonably be
regarded as a reasonable course of action in relation to the relevant tax provisions, having
regard to all the circumstances including –
(a) whether the substantive results of the arrangements are consistent with any principles on which those provisions are based (whether express or implied) and the policy
objectives of those provisions,
(b) whether the means of achieving those results involves one or more contrived or
abnormal steps, and
(c) whether the arrangements are intended to exploit any shortcomings in those provisions.

(Finance Act 2013, S. 207(2)).
Where, but for the application of the GAAR, the abusive tax arrangement
would result in a “tax advantage”,9 that advantage is “to be counteracted by
the making of adjustments,” (subject to the Act’s specified conditions and limitations (e. g. the adjustment would have to be “just and reasonable.”) (Finance Act
2013, S.209(1)).
Similarly in Canada, a transaction (or a series of transactions) is an “avoidance transaction” where, but for the GAAR in s.245 of the Income Tax Act
(“ITA”), it “would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit.” (Income Tax
Act 1985, S.245(3)(a),) If the Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) alleges
that a transaction is an “avoidance transaction”, the burden is on the taxpayer to
prove otherwise on the basis that the transaction can “reasonably be considered
to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than
to obtain the tax benefit.” (Income Tax Act 1985 S.245(3)(a)). If the taxpayer fails
to prove that the transaction is not an “avoidance transaction” then the Minister
has the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the avoidance
transaction would result in an “abuse and misuse” (either directly or indirectly)
of a provision in any of the instruments specified in s.245(4), which includes the

8 “Arrangements are ‘tax arrangements’ if, having regard to all the circumstances, it would be
reasonable to conclude that the obtaining of a tax advantage was the main purpose, or one of
the main purposes, of the arrangements” (S.207(1), Finance Act 2013) The arrangement could be
in the form of “any agreement, understanding, scheme, transaction or series of transactions
(whether or not legally enforceable).” (S.214, Finance Act 2013)
9 “A ‘tax advantage’ includes: (a) relief or increased relief from tax, (b) repayment or increased
repayment of tax, (c) avoidance or reduction of a charge to tax or an assessment to tax, (d)
avoidance of a possible assessment to tax, (e) deferral of a payment of tax or advancement of a
repayment of tax, and (f) avoidance of an obligation to deduct or account for tax.” (S.208,
Finance Act 2013)
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ITA. If the Minister fails in this task, the taxpayer would not be denied the tax
benefit even though the transaction was an “avoidance transaction” (Lipson
2009, n. 31, para 26). But if the Minister proves that the avoidance transaction
abused the relevant provision, then the taxpayer can be denied the tax
benefits from the transaction. The Minister’s determination of the denied
tax benefits must be “reasonable in the circumstances” (Income Tax Act 1985,
S.245(2),(5)).
Seen from a US perspective, a statutory GAAR could supplement existing
tools (for combating tax avoidance) by enabling the IRS to deny tax benefits
arising from arrangements that are inconsistent with Congressional intention,
rather than having to base their challenge on the taxpayer’s intentions.

4 Statutory interpretation in a GAAR analysis:
lessons from Canada
As the SCC explained in Canada Trustco, determining whether an avoidance
transaction abused the statutory provision (being relied on for a tax advantage)
involves a two-part inquiry: “The first step is to determine the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions of the Income Tax Act that are relied on for the tax
benefit, having regard to the scheme of the Act, the relevant provisions and
permissible extrinsic aids. The second step is to examine the factual context of
a case in order to determine whether the avoidance transaction defeated or
frustrated the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions in issue.” (Canada
Trustco 2005, n.31, para 55). Subsequently, in Copthorne Holding Ltd. v. Canada,
the SCC further clarified this task of interpretation in the GAAR analysis:
The object, spirit or purpose can be identified by applying the same interpretive approach
employed by this Court in all questions of statutory interpretation—a “unified textual,
contextual and purposive approach” (Trustco, at para. 47; Lipson v. Canada, 2009 SCC 1
(CanLII), [2009] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 26). While the approach is the same as in all statutory
interpretation, the analysis seeks to determine a different aspect of the statute than in
other cases. In a traditional statutory interpretation approach the court applies the textual,
contextual and purposive analysis to determine what the words of the statute mean. In a
GAAR analysis the textual, contextual and purposive analysis is employed to determine the
object, spirit or purpose of a provision. Here the meaning of the words of the statute may be
clear enough. The search is for the rationale that underlies the words that may not be
captured by the bare meaning of the words themselves. However, determining the rationale
of the relevant provisions of the Act should not be conflated with a value judgment of what
is right or wrong nor with theories about what tax law ought to be or ought to do. (3 SCR
721, 2011 SCC 63 (CanLII), para. 70).
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While the GAAR requires the courts to go “behind the words of the legislation to
determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions relied upon
by the taxpayer,” (Pièces automobiles Lecavalier Inc. v. The Queen, para 21). that
“object, spirit or purpose” must be clearly conveyed by the legislation. The
courts will not invent a legislative purpose which was not clearly conveyed in
the tax provision that the taxpayer relied on for claiming a tax advantage. As the
SCC explained (Canada Trustco, 2005, n.31, paras. 40–42):
40

41

42

There is but one principle of interpretation: to determine the intent of the legislator
having regard to the text, its context, and other indicators of legislative purpose. The
policy analysis proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC is
properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive approach to
interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit.
The courts cannot search for an overriding policy of the Act that is not based on a
unified, textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions in
issue. First, such a search is incompatible with the roles of reviewing judges. The
Income Tax Act is a compendium of highly detailed and often complex provisions. To
send the courts on the search for some overarching policy and then to use such a
policy to override the wording of the provisions of the Income Tax Act would
inappropriately place the formulation of taxation policy in the hands of the judiciary,
requiring judges to perform a task to which they are unaccustomed and for which
they are not equipped. Did Parliament intend judges to formulate taxation policies
that are not grounded in the provisions of the Act and to apply them to override the
specific provisions of the Act? Notwithstanding the interpretative challenges that the
GAAR presents, we cannot find a basis for concluding that such a marked departure
from judicial and interpretative norms was Parliament’s intent.
Second, to search for an overriding policy of the Income Tax Act that is not
anchored in a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific
provisions that are relied upon for the tax benefit would run counter to the overall
policy of Parliament that tax law be certain, predictable and fair, so that taxpayers
can intelligently order their affairs. Although Parliament’s general purpose in
enacting the GAAR was to preserve legitimate tax minimization schemes while
prohibiting abusive tax avoidance, Parliament must also be taken to seek consistency, predictability and fairness in tax law. These three latter purposes would be
frustrated if the Minister and/or the courts overrode the provisions of the Income
Tax Act without any basis in a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of
those provisions.

Accordingly, in determining whether the avoidance transaction in question had
to have real economic substance in the Canada Trustco case, the SCC construed
the object, spirit or purpose of a provision which was relied on by the taxpayer,
and restrained itself from inventing and imputing some underlying legislative
rational that was not actually conveyed by Parliament within that provision. The
court explained its analysis as follows:
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Courts have to be careful not to conclude too hastily that simply because a non-tax
purpose is not evident, the avoidance transaction is the result of abusive tax avoidance. Although the Explanatory Notes make reference to the expression “economic
substance”, s.245(4) does not consider a transaction to result in abusive tax avoidance merely because an economic or commercial purpose is not evident. As previously stated, the GAAR was not intended to outlaw all tax benefits; Parliament
intended for many to endure. The central inquiry is focussed on whether the transaction was consistent with the purpose of the provisions of the Income Tax Act that are
relied upon by the taxpayer, when those provisions are properly interpreted in light of
their context. Abusive tax avoidance will be established if the transactions frustrate or
defeat those purposes.
Whether the transactions were motivated by any economic, commercial, family or
other non-tax purpose may form part of the factual context that the courts may
consider in the analysis of abusive tax avoidance allegations under s. 245(4).
However, any finding in this respect would form only one part of the underlying
facts of a case, and would be insufficient by itself to establish abusive tax avoidance. The central issue is the proper interpretation of the relevant provisions in light
of their context and purpose. When properly interpreted, the statutory provisions at
issue in a given case may dictate that a particular tax benefit may apply only to
transactions with a certain economic, commercial, family or other non-tax purpose.
The absence of such considerations may then become a relevant factor towards the
inference that the transactions abused the provisions at issue, but there is no golden
rule in this respect.
Similarly, courts have on occasion discussed transactions in terms of their “lack of
substance” or requiring “recharacterization”. However, such terms have no meaning
in isolation from the proper interpretation of specific provisions of the Income Tax Act.
The analysis under s. 245(4) requires a close examination of the facts in order to
determine whether allowing a tax benefit would be within the object, spirit or purpose
of the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer, when those provisions are interpreted
textually, contextually and purposively. Only after first, properly construing the provisions to determine their scope and second, examining all of the relevant facts, can a
proper conclusion regarding abusive tax avoidance under s. 245(4) be reached.
A transaction may be considered to be “artificial” or to “lack substance” with respect
to specific provisions of the Income Tax Act, if allowing a tax benefit would not be
consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of those provisions. We should reject any
analysis under s. 245(4) that depends entirely on “substance” viewed in isolation
from the proper interpretation of specific provisions of the Income Tax Act or the
relevant factual context of a case. However, abusive tax avoidance may be found
where the relationships and transactions as expressed in the relevant documentation
lack a proper basis relative to the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions that are
purported to confer the tax benefit, or where they are wholly dissimilar to the
relationships or transactions that are contemplated by the provisions.
A proper approach to the wording of the provisions of the Income Tax Act together
with the relevant factual context of a given case achieve balance between the need
to address abusive tax avoidance while preserving certainty, predictability and
fairness in tax law so that taxpayers may manage their affairs accordingly.
Parliament intends taxpayers to take full advantage of the provisions of the Act
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that confer tax benefits. Parliament did not intend the GAAR to undermine this
basic tenet of tax law.
The GAAR may be applied to deny a tax benefit only after it is determined that it was
not reasonable to consider the tax benefit to be within the object, spirit or purpose of
the provisions relied upon by the taxpayer. The negative language in which s. 245(4)
is cast indicates that the starting point for the analysis is the assumption that a tax
benefit that would be conferred by the plain words of the Act is not abusive. This
means that a finding of abuse is only warranted where the opposite conclusion—that
the avoidance transaction was consistent with the object, spirit or purpose of the
provisions of the Act that are relied on by the taxpayer—cannot be reasonably
entertained. In other words, the abusive nature of the transaction must be clear.
The GAAR will not apply to deny a tax benefit where it may reasonably be considered
that the transactions were carried out in a manner consistent with the object, spirit or
purpose of the provisions of the Act, as interpreted textually, contextually and
purposively.

5 The constitutional validity of a GAAR
When drafting a GAAR, consideration should also be given to ensure compliance
with domestic constitutional requirements. GAARs are particularly at risk of
being challenged on the basis of constitutional validity because, by their nature,
they are conveyed using vaguely phrased standards so as to flexibly apply
generally. Vagueness, however, may come into conflict with constitutionally
protected rights and freedoms. There are examples of both successful and
unsuccessful constitutional challenges of GAARs.
In Poland, for example, the Polish Constitutional Court found that article
24b § 1 of the Tax Ordinance Act (“TOA”), which set out a GAAR, was unconstitutional. It was found to be “in breach of article 2 (the principle of the rule of
law) in conjunction with article 217 (the principle of legislative base for tax
liability) of the Polish Constitution, and therefore declared it to be null and void.
In consequence of this judgment, GAAR was repealed from the TOA.” (Kuźniacki
2012, p. 151).
In Canada, term “abuse” in s.245(4) of the ITA was challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague, but this was rejected by the FCA in Kaulius v. Canada.
The court held as follows (2003 FCA 371 (CanLII), para 31):
As stated in Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., 1995 CanLII 112 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, the
question is whether a law provides the basis for legal debate and coherent judicial
interpretation. If judicial interpretation is possible, an impugned law is not vague… In
the case of section 245, the Tax Court and this Court have, on several occasions, had
occasion to interpret the section and apply it. Indeed, on the facts in OSFC which are, for
practical purposes, the same facts applicable to this case, the Court was able to interpret
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subsection 245(4) and apply it. Subsection 245(4), having been interpreted and applied on
numerous occasions by the Courts, is capable of supporting legal debate and coherent
judicial interpretation. It is therefore not unconstitutionally vague.

6 Applying the lessons to the U.S.
As Aviv Pichhadze and Amir Pichhadze have observed, the SCC’s approach in
Canada Trustco is consistent with a similar trend taken by the top courts in the
U.K. and the U.S. (Pichhadze & Pichhadze 2007). For example, in Gitlitz v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue it was suggested that without judicial intervention the transaction would produce a “double windfall” for shareholders; “they
would be exempted from paying taxes on the full amount of the discharge of
indebtedness, and they would be able to increase basis and deduct their previously
suspended losses.” (Gitlitz v. C.I.R. 2001, p. 701–02). Yet the Supreme Court of the
United States held that “because the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayer here to
receive these benefits, we need not address this policy concern.” Postlewaite has
suggested that the reason for this trend in statutory interpretation is the courts’
“fear of usurping the role of the legislative branch.” (Postlewaite 2005, p. 147).
Shortly after Gitlintz, the Courts of Appeal in the U.S. reaffirmed this
approach of judicial restraint. In Coggin Automotive Corp. v. C.I.R., for example,
the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that “perhaps the tax
court is straining to extend its interpretation of the legislative histories of Section
1373 and Section 1363(d) in order to close what it perceives to be a loophole in
the case of holding companies that own no inventory yet elect S corporation
status.” Yet, as the court went on to explain (Coggin Auto. Corp., p. 1332):
In Gitlitz v. Com’r, 531 U.S. 206, 121 S.Ct. 701, 148 L.Ed.2d 613 (2001), in a case dealing with
a potential double windfall to S corporation shareholders due to a discharge of indebtedness, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers
here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy concern.” Id. at 710. “[T]he
result is required by statute.” Id. at n. 10. If “this is an inequity in the United States Tax
Code … only Congress or the Secretary (as the holder of delegated authority from Congress)
has the authority to ameliorate” it. Hillman v. Internal Revenue Service, 250 F.3d 228, 234
(4th Cir.2001); see also Brown Group, Inc. v. Com’r, 77 F.3d 217, 222 (8th Cir.1996)(where the
Eighth Circuit reversed the tax court’s use of the aggregate method of partnership taxation
to close what it perceived to be a loophole in the Internal Revenue Code in that “such a tax
loophole is not ours to close but must rather be closed or cured by Congress.”).

Following the Gitlitz case, Lipton commented that “the Supreme Court’s decision
in Gitlitz shows tax advisors that they do not need to shy away from taking a
position that is clearly mandated by the Code, even if the result is unduly
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beneficial to the taxpayer. Put simply, Congress makes the law, and the Supreme
Court said that when Congress has spoken clearly, taxpayers can rely on what
Congress has said.” (Lipton 2001, p. 138). More recently, however, Lipton revisited this issue, raising concern that, notwithstanding Gitlitz, lower courts have
been aggressively applying the economic substance doctrine in order to disallow
tax benefits which appear to be “too good to be true”, even where the transaction had a real business purpose. (Lipton 2014, p. 82, 96). In effect, as Lipton
explains, “the judicial doctrines have been expanded into what appears to be a
new provision in the Code – Section ‘I Don’t Like it’.”(Lipton 2014, p. 83). Lipton
rightly cautions that this is a very worrisome development which undermines
certainty in tax planning; certainty “which usually can be found by applying the
rules in the Code and the Regulations.” Lipton goes on to conclude as follows
(Lipton 2014, p. 96):
The courts appear to be intent on reaching what they view is the ‘right’ result, even if the
literal provisions of the Code do not help them. The economic substance doctrine is the
crutch they have used to assist them in their analysis.
What makes this approach even more interesting is that the one court that matters the
most—the Supreme Court—has previously taken a more stringent approach in applying the
literal words of the Code. The most recent example of this was Gitlitz, 531 U.S. 206, 87
AFTR2d 2001–417 (2001), in which the interaction of the rules for computing the basis of
stock in an S corporation, when combined with the exclusion of COD income for an S
corporation, resulted in a large tax benefit—a basis increase with no income! The IRS
argued that this result was contrary to Congress’s intent (which it clearly was), but the
Court had no problem dismissing that argument. According to the Court: ‘Because the
Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address
this policy concern.’
The approach taken by the Supreme Court in Gitlitz does not appear to be matched by the
language applied today in the lower courts, which seem focused on whether or not a result
is ‘fair’ (in the court’ opinion) and consistent with the way that Congress intended the law
to operate (or, more often, would have intended if Congress actually had thought about the
issue). The problem with the lower courts’ approach, however, is that any certainty that is
generated by a Code-based system is effectively eliminated by the courts’ substitution of
their own views of how the law should operate in place of what the statute literally says.
Cases with identical facts can lead to wildy different results – witness the STARS decisions.

Notwithstanding the criticisms that some have expressed towards the SCC’s
approach in the Canada Trustco case, these developments in the US support
the SCC’s restrained approach to statutory interpretation in order to preserve a
“balance between the need to address abusive tax avoidance while preserving
certainty, predictability and fairness in tax law so that taxpayers may manage
their affairs accordingly.”(Canada Trustco 2005, n.31, para. 61).
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Yet, even in the U.S., Lipson’s alarm should not be over-exaggerated. One
can take some comfort, for example, by the recent decision of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit in Ball ex rel. Ball v. C.I.R. In this case, “the Tax
Court noted that any conclusion other than a holding that ‘unrecognized gain
from a Qsub election does not constitute an item of income or tax-exempt
income under § 1366(a)(1)(A),’ would lead to ‘absurd results’ and ‘open the
door to a myriad of abusive transactions’.” (Ball 2014, p. 562). Yet, as the Court
of Appeal held (Ball 2014, p. 562):
The Supreme Court in Gitlitz, however, refused to address this policy argument when the
text of the Code was clear. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220, 121 S.Ct. 701 (“Because the Code’s plain
text permits the taxpayers here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy
concern.”). Although statutory text cannot be read in a way that creates an absurdity, the
payment of some taxes and not others is not an absurdity, but rather a policy choice rightly
left to Congress. Id. Indeed, Congress, subsequent to Gitlitz, made changes to the statute at
issue in that case to prevent further uses of the tax code loophole.

It can therefore be expected that, should the U.S. Congress decide to also adopt
a statutory GAAR, the U.S. courts would (or at least should) exercise judicial
restraint in their statutory interpretation similar to the SCC’s approach in Canada
Trustco. This leaves us with an issue that is accentuated by the use of a GAAR.
As Arnold pointed out, “very few statutory provisions explicitly refer to economic substance; therefore, economic substance is unlikely to be an important
factor in the application of the GAAR if the Supreme Court’s approach is adhered
to strictly by the lower courts.” (Arnold 2007, p. 4).
Accordingly, if the Canadian Parliament intends to require economic substance
for the purposes of any particular tax provision, it should clearly convey that
intention. That also applies to any other legislative intentions throughout the ITA.
This would similarly apply to the intentions of the U.S. Congress in the tax
Code, should Congress choose to apply a GAAR. “A GAAR will not operate
properly unless the underlying law is based on a clearly stated principle,
because without such a principle or objective it is impossible to decide whether
there has been abuse of the legislation.” (Freedman 2014, p. 168). In this sense,
Freedman is correct in suggesting that GAARs could actually improve the underlying tax legislation.
Moreover, the U.S. Congress would need to carefully draft the GAAR in order
to avoid conflict with constitutionally protected rights and freedoms, similar to
the allegations made in Poland and Canada. A GAAR could, for example, be
challenged for being unconstitutionally vague on due process grounds. “The
concept of unconstitutional vagueness means no prohibition can stand or penalty attach where an individual could not reasonably understand his
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contemplated conduct is proscribed… Any statute, including a rule or regulation
of an administrative agency, which forbids an act in terms so vague persons of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law… This principle
requires the statute provide explicit standards to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” (Stastny 1982, pgs. 505–06).
In the context of tax legislation, the Court of Appeal for the Sixth District
similarly explained that: “An enactment may be declared unconstitutionally vague
under the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution… ‘if it fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits [or] if it authorizes or even
encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ A tax law in particular
‘must prescribe a standard sufficiently definite to be understandable to the average
person who desires to comply with it.’” (Patel 2002, p. 486).
“The degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates – as well as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement – depends in part on the nature of the enactment… Specifically, vagueness in statutes with criminal penalties is tolerated less than
vagueness in those with civil penalties because of the severity of the potential consequences of the imprecision.”(Shew 2014, pgs. 253–54). “Where economic or commercial
interests are involved, a lesser standard is utilized for determining vagueness.” (Singer and
Singer, 2002 §21:16).

While a GAAR could be challenged on constitutional grounds, doing so would
expectedly be an uphill battle. “Laws are entitled to a ‘strong presumption of
constitutionality,’ and any party challenging the constitutionality of a law ‘bears
the burden of proving that the law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (Buckley 2005, p. 815.). Moreover, it should be noted that “the void-forvagueness doctrine ‘does not require statutes to be drafted with scientific precision.’ Rather, ‘it permits a statute’s certainty to be ascertained by application of
commonly accepted tools of judicial construction, with courts indulging every
reasonable interpretation in favor of finding the statute constitutional.’ The bar
is not a high one, and a ‘civil statute that is not concerned with the First
Amendment is only unconstitutionally vague if it is ‘so vague and indefinite as
really to be no rule [or standard] at all’ or if it is ‘substantially incomprehensible.’” (Buckley, pgs. 815–6). In tax legislation, some degree of vagueness is to
be expected and would be tolerated. As the Supreme Court of California
explained (Evangelatos 1988, pgs. 592–3):
Many, probably most, statutes are ambiguous in some respects and instances invariably
arise under which the application of statutory language may be unclear. So long as a
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statute does not threaten to infringe on the exercise of First Amendment or other constitutional rights, however, such ambiguities, even if numerous, do not justify the invalidation
of a statute on its face. In order to succeed on a facial vagueness challenge to a legislative
measure that does not threaten constitutionally protected conduct – like the initiative
measure at issue here – a party must do more than identify some instances in which the
application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate that ‘the
law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.’

When applying the ‘void for vagueness’ doctrine, the US Supreme Court cautioned that “the fact that Congress might, without difficulty, have chosen ‘(c)
learer and more precise language’ equally capable of achieving the end which it
sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague.”
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